Market power and gatekeepers: complements or substitutes?

Although they are distinctive instruments, Article 102 TFEU and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) commonly target undertakings with high degrees of economic power. In Article 102TFEU, market power assessment, including market definition has been considerably challenged by specific features of digital markets. With the use of thresholds-based presumptions to designate gatekeepers, the DMA thus purportedly moves away from Article 102 TFEU analytics. This article questions the extent to which market power and gatekeeper powers are substitutes, or complements, regarding the analytical tools used, and regarding the purposes to which they contribute. While market power methodology moves away from quantitative methods, for greater accuracy, the DMA reinjects a great dose of quantitative-based tools. Yet, as the DMA decisional practice shows, both analyses comprise, with varied intensity, an assessment of qualitative factors, revolving around barriers to entry. In addition, issues of boundaries’ delineation feature in both methodologies. The tools on which they rely are substitutes, but with complementary scope and outcomes. Finally, market and gatekeeper powers may be both substitutes in how they contribute to contestability of markets, albeit with a complementary twist: respectively with access to a user base for the DMA, and in a relevant market for Article 102 TFEU.