The Grounding of the Intrinsic Value of Nature: A Role for Theism?

Protection of the environment and its life forms has become a significant concern among philosophers and theologians alike in recent years. There is disagreement, however, over the best way to formulate the grounds of this concern. Some philosophers and theologians favor an instrumental or anthropocentric approach, claiming that adequate preservation of wildlife is warranted solely on the basis of benefits provided to humans, whether couched in terms of the satisfaction of material, medicinal, recreational, or psychological needs. Others claim that wild nature should be preserved for its own sake, due to its life forms possessing intrinsic value. How best to articulate and defend the intrinsic value of wildlife, however, has been much disputed. This paper first compares the adequacy of anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics. It concludes that a non-anthropocentric theory of the intrinsic value of living creatures is best suited to motivate care for and action on behalf of the environment, and, in addition, most accurately reflects the basis of human concern for the environment. This paper next goes on to examine the philosophical underpinnings required for a theory of the intrinsic value of nature. It argues that an objective account of the intrinsic value of nature, founded on some form of <i>non-naturalist ethics</i> or <i>minimal theism</i>, seems necessary to account for the intrinsic value of nature (in contrast with a purely subjective or naturalist approach). In particular, a sacramental view of nature wherein creation issues from a creator who is goodness itself seems ideal for grounding the intrinsic value of wildlife, along with motivating humans to contribute energy and resources to their conservation and even to sacrifice some of their interests in order to do so. This being the case, rather than being a hindrance to environmental ethics, religion, if properly formulated, can be a most helpful ally.