The negative intelligence-religiosity link may be differentiated according to cognitive test g-loadings and (Christian) religious denominations: primary study and meta-analytical evidence

Negative intelligence and religiosity associations have been well established. Despite a broad consensus about the direction of this effect, reported effect strengths differed substantially in previous research. Because measurement modalities regarding religiosity and intelligence have been found to explain some of the identified inconsistencies, the literature would benefit from thoroughly assessing both constructs. Moreover, little is known about the role of the influence of the g-loadedness of an intelligence test or the role of religious denominations. Most proposed explanations suggest that the intelligence and religiosity association is on g, rather than specific cognitive abilities. However, systematic empirical evidence on the generality of religiosity link with intelligence domains is currently unavailable and the potential causes of the intelligence and religiosity link are little understood. Here, we used subject-level data of American participants of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) as well as a meta-analytical approach to examine test g-loading-specific effects on the intelligence and religiosity link. The primary data analyses (for two religiosity measures: η2 = 0.49 and η2 = 0.54) as well as the meta-analytical approach (r = 0.12 for poor vs. r = −0.20 for excellent g-loadedness) yielded indications of more pronounced intelligence and religiosity associations for studies assessing intelligence with more g-loaded tasks, thus tentatively suggesting a causal direction of intelligence influences on religiosity. Moreover, results of our primary data analyses suggest stronger associations of intelligence with religious beliefs than with religious behaviors in Catholic (r = −0.09 vs. r = 0.04), but not in Protestant (r = −0.06 vs. r < 0.01) participants.