Changing the rules of the game to encourage a collaborative arrangement: the case of the Dutch regional energy strategy

Abstract Background In the Netherlands, a Regional Energy Strategy (RES) has been introduced to foster collaboration in allocating spatial and energy resources to meet climate goals. However, the market-based rules guiding the RES are often perceived as ineffective, unfair, and inefficient, resulting in limited participation and poor information sharing. Planning currently follows a ‘first come, first served’ principle. National legislative changes are being prepared to improve the RES. Yet, it remains unclear how these might improve the process. This study aims to explore, through a serious game, whether changes in rules can enhance the RES and, if so, how this improvement is achieved. Three scenarios are evaluated: (1) a business-as-usual situation with existing market rules; (2) a government-led scenario in which provinces play a stronger role by prioritizing spatial needs; and (3) a governance-led scenario in which energy planners are allowed to manage the grid more flexibly, giving grid planning a central role in steering spatial energy decisions. Results The findings show that altering the rules of the game allowed more flexible grid management, based on a governance rationale and collaborative decision-making. The changes in rules produced spatial energy planning outcomes perceived as much more effective, efficient, and fair. These simulated rule changes created better conditions for spatial and energy planners to interact and make decisions that optimize both spatial and energy needs. Conclusions The simulation results suggest that the RES can achieve better outcomes when specific rules are adjusted, particularly in relation to energy network planning, with key actors taking the lead under a governance-oriented approach.