Engineering Power: The Classification of Presidential Constitutional Manipulation in Sub-Saharan Africa (1990–2020)

This paper investigates the phenomenon of presidential constitutional engineering (PCE) in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2020. It introduces a novel conceptual framework and classification system that captures the most frequent and impactful strategies used by political elites to retain power through legal-constitutional means. These include manipulating term limits, adopting new constitutions to reset term counts, altering electoral systems, and imposing restrictive candidacy conditions. Unlike broader notions of electoral manipulation, the paper focuses specifically on legal-constitutional reforms that reshape the structure of presidential competition. Drawing on our dataset of documented PCE attempts, it offers comparative insights into institutional fragility and the concentration of executive power. The framework contributes to both academic debate and policy design by offering a clear typology that scholars and practitioners can adapt to assess democratic resilience and constitutional stability across presidential systems.