Stackelberg game analysis of government subsidy on sustainable off-site construction and low-carbon logistics
Abstrak
This paper considers promoting off-site construction using government subsidy. A three-stage Stackelberg game model is formulated for the optimal subsidy design for the government, accounting for the decisions of government, suppliers (owners of off-site construction yards), and customers (entities that buy precast concrete from the suppliers). The government has two objectives: one is to maximize the use of precast concrete produced by regional yards and the other is to reduce green-house gas emissions from the transport of precast concrete. A number of properties of the three-stage Stackelberg game framework have been analyzed. We find that an inappropriately designed subsidy scheme may decrease the use of precast concrete produced by regional yards and increase green-house gas emissions from the transport of precast concrete, compared with a no-subsidy benchmark.
Topik & Kata Kunci
Penulis (3)
Wen Yi
Lu Zhen
Yong Jin
Akses Cepat
PDF tidak tersedia langsung
Cek di sumber asli →- Tahun Terbit
- 2021
- Sumber Database
- DOAJ
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.clscn.2021.100013
- Akses
- Open Access ✓