Media independence and share ownership structure in Indonesian media with a focus on Tempo

Abstract Media independence is often tested where political actors and advertisers can exert pressure. And we know less about how employee-based share ownership works as a governance mechanism for independence. This study examines how ownership structure conditions newsroom autonomy through a qualitative study of Tempo. Using Giddens’ structuration theory and Mosco’s political economy of communication, we analyse how newsroom rules and resources interact with allocative power from markets and state-linked advertisers. Data come from observation of editorial routines, document analysis of Tempo’s share ownership, and interviews with the Editor-in-Chief, current journalists, and six former journalists. Findings show that dispersed ownership involving employees and foundations strengthens internal bargaining power and supports editorial decisions made in collective meetings, helping the newsroom resist threats and advertising boycotts while maintaining verification norms. At the same time, reliance on major advertisers creates channels for pressure that require continual organisational buffering. The study concludes that employee share ownership can function as a protective governance arrangement for media independence and suggests future research to explore comparative and longitudinal research linking ownership structures to content and observable independence.