Unbunking Arguments
Abstrak
Abstract This chapter develops a style of argument that realists can use to defend the methodological propriety of appealing to a given range of intuitions. Unbunking arguments are an epistemically positive analogue of debunking arguments, and they revolve around the claim that the processes dominantly responsible for beliefs about a given domain are reliable. However, processes cannot always be assessed for accuracy with respect to the relevant domain, so this chapter also develops the cross-domain strategy, which involves arguing that processes known to be reliable in one domain are similarly reliable with respect to a different domain. The chapter ends by unbunking our metaphysical intuitions about mutual supervenience by way of a cross-domain strategy that draws on cognitive scientific research into our ability to track correlations.
Penulis (1)
Christopher Frugé
Akses Cepat
PDF tidak tersedia langsung
Cek di sumber asli →- Tahun Terbit
- 2019
- Bahasa
- en
- Sumber Database
- CrossRef
- DOI
- 10.1093/oso/9780190639679.003.0016
- Akses
- Terbatas