arXiv
Open Access
2026
Sampling Logit Equilibrium and Endogenous Payoff Distortion
Minoru Osawa
Abstrak
We introduce the sampling logit equilibrium (SLE), a stationary concept for population games in which agents evaluate actions using a finite sample of opponents' plays and respond according to a logit choice rule. This framework combines informational frictions from finite sampling with stochastic choice. When the sample size is large, SLE is well approximated by a logit equilibrium of a virtual game whose payoffs incorporate explicit distortion terms generated by sampling noise. Examples illustrate how finite sampling can systematically shift equilibrium behavior and generate equilibrium selection effects.
Penulis (1)
M
Minoru Osawa
Akses Cepat
Informasi Jurnal
- Tahun Terbit
- 2026
- Bahasa
- en
- Sumber Database
- arXiv
- Akses
- Open Access ✓