arXiv Open Access 2026

Beyond Hurwicz: Incentive Compatibility under Informational Decentralization

David Lancashire

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Abstrak

Achieving incentive compatibility under informational decentralization is impossible within the class of direct and revelation-equivalent mechanisms typically studied in economics and computer science. We show that these impossibility results are conditional by identifying a narrow class of non-revelation-equivalent mechanisms that sustain enforcement by inferring preferences indirectly through parallel, uncorrelatable games.

Topik & Kata Kunci

econ.TH

Penulis (1)

David Lancashire

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Lancashire, D. (2026). Beyond Hurwicz: Incentive Compatibility under Informational Decentralization. https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.01790

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Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2026
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓