arXiv Open Access 2026

Measuring the benefits of lying in MARA under egalitarian social welfare

Jonathan Carrero Ismael Rodriguez Fernando Rubio

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Abstrak

When some resources are to be distributed among a set of agents following egalitarian social welfare, the goal is to maximize the utility of the agent whose utility turns out to be minimal. In this context, agents can have an incentive to lie about their actual preferences, so that more valuable resources are assigned to them. In this paper we analyze this situation, and we present a practical study where genetic algorithms are used to assess the benefits of lying under different situations.

Topik & Kata Kunci

cs.GT cs.NE

Penulis (3)

Jonathan Carrero

Ismael Rodriguez

Fernando Rubio

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APA MLA BibTeX

Carrero, J., Rodriguez, I., Rubio, F. (2026). Measuring the benefits of lying in MARA under egalitarian social welfare. https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.09354

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Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2026
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓