arXiv Open Access 2025

Entry deterrence and antibiotic conservation under post-entry Bertrand competition

Roberto Mazzoleni Hamza Virk

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Abstrak

We analyze how an incumbent antibiotic monopolist responds to the threat of post-entry Bertrand competition by a vertically differentiated rival. In a two-period model where current production drives future resistance, Bertrand competition leads to a winner-take-all outcome. We find that strategic deterrence is optimal regardless of bacterial cross-resistance to prospective rival drugs. In contrast with post-entry Cournot competition, anticipated price competition provides the incumbent with a stronger strategic incentive for conservation.

Topik & Kata Kunci

econ.GN

Penulis (2)

Roberto Mazzoleni

Hamza Virk

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APA MLA BibTeX

Mazzoleni, R., Virk, H. (2025). Entry deterrence and antibiotic conservation under post-entry Bertrand competition. https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.05261

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Tahun Terbit: 2025
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓