arXiv
Open Access
2025
Nash Equilibria with Irradical Probabilities
Edan Orzech
Martin Rinard
Abstrak
We present for every $n\ge4$ an $n$-player game in normal form with payoffs in $\{0,1,2\}$ that has a unique, fully mixed, Nash equilibrium in which all the probability weights are irradical (i.e., algebraic but not closed form expressible even with $m$-th roots for any integer $m$).
Penulis (2)
E
Edan Orzech
M
Martin Rinard
Akses Cepat
Informasi Jurnal
- Tahun Terbit
- 2025
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