arXiv Open Access 2025

Checking Cheap Talk

Ian Ball Xin Gao

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Abstrak

We consider a sender-receiver game in which the receiver's action is binary and the sender's preferences are state-independent. The state is multidimensional. The receiver can select one dimension of the state to check (i.e., observe) before choosing his action. We identify a class of influential equilibria in which the sender's message reveals which components of the state are highest, and the receiver selects one of these components to check. The sender can benefit from communication if and only if she prefers one of these equilibria to the no-communication outcome. Similar equilibria exist when the receiver can check multiple dimensions.

Topik & Kata Kunci

econ.TH

Penulis (2)

Ian Ball

Xin Gao

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Ball, I., Gao, X. (2025). Checking Cheap Talk. https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.09875

Akses Cepat

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Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2025
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓