arXiv Open Access 2024

Approximate Revenue from Finite Range Mechanisms

Mridu Prabal Goswami

Lihat Sumber

Abstrak

We consider an economic environment where a seller wants to sell an indivisible unit of good to a buyer. We show that revenue from any strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism defined on closed intervals of rich single crossing domains considered in \citep{Goswami1}, can be approximated by the revenue from a sequence of strategy-proof and individually rational mechanisms with finite range. Thus while studying optimal mechanisms without loss of generality we can study mechanisms with finite range.

Topik & Kata Kunci

cs.GT econ.TH

Penulis (1)

Mridu Prabal Goswami

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Goswami, M.P. (2024). Approximate Revenue from Finite Range Mechanisms. https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.08342

Akses Cepat

Lihat di Sumber

Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2024
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓