arXiv
Open Access
2024
Orchestrating Organizational Politics: Baron and Ferejohn Meet Tullock
Qiang Fu
Zenan Wu
Yuxuan Zhu
Abstrak
This paper examines the optimal organizational rules that govern the process of dividing a fixed surplus. The process is modeled as a sequential multilateral bargaining game with costly recognition. The designer sets the voting rule -- i.e., the minimum number of votes required to approve a proposal -- and the mechanism for proposer recognition, which is modeled as a biased generalized lottery contest. We show that for diverse design objectives, the optimum can be achieved by a dictatorial voting rule, which simplifies the game into a standard biased contest model.
Topik & Kata Kunci
Penulis (3)
Q
Qiang Fu
Z
Zenan Wu
Y
Yuxuan Zhu
Akses Cepat
Informasi Jurnal
- Tahun Terbit
- 2024
- Bahasa
- en
- Sumber Database
- arXiv
- Akses
- Open Access ✓