arXiv
Open Access
2024
Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy
Shiri Alouf-Heffetz
Tanmay Inamdar
Pallavi Jain
Yash More
Nimrod Talmon
Abstrak
In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess more voting weight than others. As a result, it opens up certain possibilities of vote manipulation, including control and bribery, that do not exist in standard voting scenarios of direct democracy. Here we formalize a certain kind of election control -- in which an external agent may change certain delegation arcs -- and study the computational complexity of the corresponding combinatorial problem.
Penulis (5)
S
Shiri Alouf-Heffetz
T
Tanmay Inamdar
P
Pallavi Jain
Y
Yash More
N
Nimrod Talmon
Akses Cepat
Informasi Jurnal
- Tahun Terbit
- 2024
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- en
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- arXiv
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- Open Access ✓