arXiv Open Access 2023

Institutional Screening and the Sustainability of Conditional Cooperation

Ethan Holdahl Jiabin Wu

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Abstrak

This paper studies a preference evolution model in which a population of agents are matched to play a sequential prisoner's dilemma in an incomplete information environment. An institution can design an incentive-compatible screening scheme, such as a special zone that requires an entry fee, or a costly label for purchase, to segregate the conditional cooperators from the non-cooperators. We show that institutional intervention of this sort can help the conditional cooperators to prevail when the psychological benefit of cooperating for them is sufficiently strong and the membership of the special zone or the label is inheritable with a sufficiently high probability.

Topik & Kata Kunci

econ.GN

Penulis (2)

Ethan Holdahl

Jiabin Wu

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Holdahl, E., Wu, J. (2023). Institutional Screening and the Sustainability of Conditional Cooperation. https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.02813

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Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2023
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓