arXiv Open Access 2022

Strategyproofness-Exposing Descriptions of Matching Mechanisms

Yannai A. Gonczarowski Ori Heffetz Clayton Thomas

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Abstrak

A menu description exposes strategyproofness by presenting a mechanism to player $i$ in two steps. Step (1) uses others' reports to describe $i$'s menu of potential outcomes. Step (2) uses $i$'s report to select $i$'s favorite outcome from her menu. We provide novel menu descriptions of the Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC) matching mechanisms. For TTC, our description additionally yields a proof of the strategyproofness of TTC's traditional description, in a way that we prove is impossible for DA.

Topik & Kata Kunci

econ.TH cs.CC cs.GT

Penulis (3)

Yannai A. Gonczarowski

Ori Heffetz

Clayton Thomas

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Gonczarowski, Y.A., Heffetz, O., Thomas, C. (2022). Strategyproofness-Exposing Descriptions of Matching Mechanisms. https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.13148

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Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2022
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓