arXiv
Open Access
2022
Selection on moral hazard in the Swiss market for mandatory health insurance: Empirical evidence from Swiss Household Panel data
Francetic Igor
Abstrak
Selection on moral hazard represents the tendency to select a specific health insurance coverage depending on the heterogeneity in utilisation ''slopes''. I use data from the Swiss Household Panel and from publicly available regulatory data to explore the extent of selection on slopes in the Swiss managed competition system. I estimate responses in terms of (log) doctor visits to lowest and highest deductible levels using Roy-type models, identifying marginal treatment effects with local instrumental variables. The response to high coverage plans (i.e. plans with the lowest deductible level) among high moral hazard types is 25-35 percent higher than average.
Topik & Kata Kunci
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Francetic Igor
Akses Cepat
Informasi Jurnal
- Tahun Terbit
- 2022
- Bahasa
- en
- Sumber Database
- arXiv
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- Open Access ✓