arXiv
Open Access
2022
Gacha Game: When Prospect Theory Meets Optimal Pricing
Tan Gan
Abstrak
I study the optimal pricing process for selling a unit good to a buyer with prospect theory preferences. In the presence of probability weighting, the buyer is dynamically inconsistent and can be either sophisticated or naive about her own inconsistency. If the buyer is naive, the uniquely optimal mechanism is to sell a ``loot box'' that delivers the good with some constant probability in each period. In contrast, if the buyer is sophisticated, the uniquely optimal mechanism introduces worst-case insurance: after successive failures in obtaining the good from all previous loot boxes, the buyer can purchase the good at full price.
Topik & Kata Kunci
Penulis (1)
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Tan Gan
Akses Cepat
Informasi Jurnal
- Tahun Terbit
- 2022
- Bahasa
- en
- Sumber Database
- arXiv
- Akses
- Open Access ✓