arXiv Open Access 2022

Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Multiplayer Prisoners Dilemma Supergames

Davidson Cheng

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Abstrak

We propose a finite automaton-style solution concept for supergames. In our model, we define an equilibrium to be a cycle of state switches and a supergame to be an infinite walk on states of a finite stage game. We show that if the stage game is locally non-cooperative, and the utility function is monotonously decreasing as the number of defective agents increases, the symmetric multiagent prisoners' dilemma supergame must contain one symmetric equilibrium and can contain asymmetric equilibria.

Topik & Kata Kunci

econ.TH

Penulis (1)

Davidson Cheng

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Cheng, D. (2022). Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Multiplayer Prisoners Dilemma Supergames. https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.13772

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Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2022
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓