arXiv Open Access 2022

Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games with Unknown Information Structure

Konan Hara Yuki Ito Paul Koh

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Abstrak

We develop an empirical framework for analyzing dynamic games when the underlying information structure is unknown to the analyst. We introduce \textit{Markov correlated equilibrium}, a dynamic analog of Bayes correlated equilibrium, and show that its predictions coincide with the Markov perfect equilibrium predictions attainable when players observe richer signals than the analyst assumes. We provide tractable methods for informationally robust estimation, inference, and counterfactual analysis. We illustrate the framework with a dynamic entry game between Starbucks and Dunkin' in the US and study the role of informational assumptions.

Topik & Kata Kunci

econ.EM

Penulis (3)

Konan Hara

Yuki Ito

Paul Koh

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Hara, K., Ito, Y., Koh, P. (2022). Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games with Unknown Information Structure. https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.03706

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Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2022
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓