arXiv Open Access 2021

Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets

Gian Caspari Manshu Khanna

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Abstrak

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate non-standard choice behavior.

Topik & Kata Kunci

econ.TH

Penulis (2)

Gian Caspari

Manshu Khanna

Format Sitasi

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Caspari, G., Khanna, M. (2021). Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets. https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.06815

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Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2021
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓