arXiv Open Access 2021

Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade

Yuan Deng Jieming Mao Balasubramanian Sivan Kangning Wang

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Abstrak

We study bilateral trade between two strategic agents. The celebrated result of Myerson and Satterthwaite states that in general, no incentive-compatible, individually rational and weakly budget balanced mechanism can be efficient. I.e., no mechanism with these properties can guarantee a trade whenever buyer value exceeds seller cost. Given this, a natural question is whether there exists a mechanism with these properties that guarantees a constant fraction of the first-best gains-from-trade, namely a constant fraction of the gains-from-trade attainable whenever buyer's value weakly exceeds seller's cost. In this work, we positively resolve this long-standing open question on constant-factor approximation, mentioned in several previous works, using a simple mechanism.

Topik & Kata Kunci

cs.GT cs.DS econ.TH

Penulis (4)

Yuan Deng

Jieming Mao

Balasubramanian Sivan

Kangning Wang

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Deng, Y., Mao, J., Sivan, B., Wang, K. (2021). Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade. https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.03611

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Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2021
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓