Game-Theoretic Models of Moral and Other-Regarding Agents (extended abstract)
Abstrak
We investigate Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, a class of non-Nashian, morally motivated courses of action that was recently proposed in the economics literature. We highlight a number of problems with such equilibria, including computational intractability, a high price of miscoordination, and problematic extension to general normal form games. We give such a generalization based on concept of program equilibria, and point out that that a practically relevant generalization may not exist. To remedy this we propose some general, intuitive, computationally tractable, other-regarding equilibria that are special cases Kantian equilibria, as well as a class of courses of action that interpolates between purely self-regarding and Kantian behavior.
Penulis (1)
Gabriel Istrate
Akses Cepat
- Tahun Terbit
- 2021
- Bahasa
- en
- Sumber Database
- arXiv
- Akses
- Open Access ✓