Efficient Competitions and Online Learning with Strategic Forecasters
Abstrak
Winner-take-all competitions in forecasting and machine-learning suffer from distorted incentives. Witkowski et al. 2018 identified this problem and proposed ELF, a truthful mechanism to select a winner. We show that, from a pool of $n$ forecasters, ELF requires $Θ(n\log n)$ events or test data points to select a near-optimal forecaster with high probability. We then show that standard online learning algorithms select an $ε$-optimal forecaster using only $O(\log(n) / ε^2)$ events, by way of a strong approximate-truthfulness guarantee. This bound matches the best possible even in the nonstrategic setting. We then apply these mechanisms to obtain the first no-regret guarantee for non-myopic strategic experts.
Penulis (4)
Rafael Frongillo
Robert Gomez
Anish Thilagar
Bo Waggoner
Akses Cepat
- Tahun Terbit
- 2021
- Bahasa
- en
- Sumber Database
- arXiv
- Akses
- Open Access ✓