arXiv Open Access 2020

Data Trading with a Monopoly Social Network: Outcomes are Mostly Privacy Welfare Damaging

Ranjan Pal Junhui Li Yixuan Wang Mingyan Liu Swades De +1 lainnya

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Abstrak

This paper argues that data of strategic individuals with heterogeneous privacy valuations in a distributed online social network (e.g., Facebook) will be under-priced, if traded in a monopoly buyer setting, and will lead to diminishing utilitarian welfare. This result, for a certain family of online community data trading problems, is in stark contrast to a popular information economics intuition that increased amounts of end-user data signals in a data market improves its efficiency. Our proposed theory paves the way for a future (counter-intuitive) analysis of data trading oligopoly markets for online social networks (OSNs).

Topik & Kata Kunci

cs.SI

Penulis (6)

Ranjan Pal

Junhui Li

Yixuan Wang

Mingyan Liu

Swades De

Jon Crowcroft

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Pal, R., Li, J., Wang, Y., Liu, M., De, S., Crowcroft, J. (2020). Data Trading with a Monopoly Social Network: Outcomes are Mostly Privacy Welfare Damaging. https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.08729

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Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2020
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓