arXiv
Open Access
2020
Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation
Bruno Yun
Srdjan Vesic
Nir Oren
Abstrak
In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.
Penulis (3)
B
Bruno Yun
S
Srdjan Vesic
N
Nir Oren
Akses Cepat
Informasi Jurnal
- Tahun Terbit
- 2020
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- en
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- arXiv
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- Open Access ✓