arXiv Open Access 2020

A Note on Solving Discretely-Constrained Nash-Cournot Games via Complementarity

Dimitri J. Papageorgiou Francisco Trespalacios Stuart Harwood

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Abstrak

Discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games have attracted attention as they arise in various competitive energy production settings in which players must make one or more discrete decisions. Gabriel et al. ["Solving discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games with an application to power markets." Networks and Spatial Economics 13(3), 2013] claim that the set of equilibria to a discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot game coincides with the set of solutions to a corresponding discretely-constrained mixed complementarity problem. We show that this claim is false.

Topik & Kata Kunci

econ.TH math.OC

Penulis (3)

Dimitri J. Papageorgiou

Francisco Trespalacios

Stuart Harwood

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Papageorgiou, D.J., Trespalacios, F., Harwood, S. (2020). A Note on Solving Discretely-Constrained Nash-Cournot Games via Complementarity. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.01536

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Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2020
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓