arXiv
Open Access
2016
Two statements of the Duggan-Schwartz theorem
Egor Ianovski
Abstrak
The Duggan-Schwartz theorem (Duggan and Schwartz, 1992) is a famous result concerning strategy-proof social choice correspondences, often stated as "A social choice correspondence that can be manipulated by neither an optimist nor a pessimist has a weak dictator". However, this formulation is actually due to Taylor (2002), and the original theorem, at face value, looks rather different. In this note we show that the two are in fact equivalent.
Topik & Kata Kunci
Penulis (1)
E
Egor Ianovski
Akses Cepat
Informasi Jurnal
- Tahun Terbit
- 2016
- Bahasa
- en
- Sumber Database
- arXiv
- Akses
- Open Access ✓