arXiv Open Access 2015

An Analysis of Dual-Issue Final-Offer Arbitration

Brian Powers
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Abstrak

We discuss final-offer arbitration where two quantitative issues are in dispute and model it as a zero-sum game. Under reasonable assumptions we both derive a pure strategy pair and show that it is both a local equilibrium and furthermore that it is the unique global equilibrium.

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B

Brian Powers

Format Sitasi

Powers, B. (2015). An Analysis of Dual-Issue Final-Offer Arbitration. https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.02864

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2015
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arXiv
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