arXiv Open Access 2013

Designing Electronic Markets for Defeasible-based Contractual Agents

Adrian Groza

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Abstrak

The design of punishment policies applied to specific domains linking agents actions to material penalties is an open research issue. The proposed framework applies principles of contract law to set penalties: expectation damages, opportunity cost, reliance damages, and party design remedies. In order to decide which remedy provides maximum welfare within an electronic market, a simulation environment called DEMCA (Designing Electronic Markets for Contractual Agents) was developed. Knowledge representation and the reasoning capabilities of the agents are based on an extended version of temporal defeasible logic.

Topik & Kata Kunci

cs.MA

Penulis (1)

Adrian Groza

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APA MLA BibTeX

Groza, A. (2013). Designing Electronic Markets for Defeasible-based Contractual Agents. https://arxiv.org/abs/1304.5545

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Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2013
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓