arXiv Open Access 2012

Cake Cutting Mechanisms

Egor Ianovski

Lihat Sumber

Abstrak

We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the presence of strategic agents has equilibria that are not dominated by the allocations of any mechanism. We identify that the equilibria of this game coincide with the allocations of an existing cake cutting mechanism.

Topik & Kata Kunci

cs.GT

Penulis (1)

Egor Ianovski

Format Sitasi

APA MLA BibTeX

Ianovski, E. (2012). Cake Cutting Mechanisms. https://arxiv.org/abs/1203.0100

Akses Cepat

Lihat di Sumber

Informasi Jurnal

Tahun Terbit: 2012
Bahasa: en
Sumber Database: arXiv
Akses: Open Access ✓